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Petitioner/Appellant Kennecott Corporation ("Kenne-
cott") , pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, hereby replies to the briefs of the State Tax Commis-
sion of Utah ("Commission") and Salt Lake County ("County"). 
I. NEITHER THE COMMISSION NOR THE COUNTY REFUTE THE 
FACT THAT KENNECOTT7S PROPERTY WAS NOT VALUED 
USING THE CAPITALIZED NET REVENUE METHOD IN 1988. 
The Commission's brief states that "the Tax Commission 
values mining property under the capitalized net revenue method 
and the summation method but uses the higher of the two methods 
for assessment purposes." Brief of Commission at 10. The Coun-
ty's brief, citing Kennecott's brief and the Hearing Transcript, 
acknowledges that because the capitalized net revenue method 
resulted in a lower assessment, "the value placed on the property 
for assessment purposes was the 'summation of the physical 
assets.'" Brief of County at 8. Therefore, both the Commission 
and the County concede, as Kennecott has demonstrated, that the 
1
 The County's brief contains an unsupported statement that 
Mr. Eyre's testimony at the hearing "does not establish, as 
Kennecott asserts, that the property was not assessed utilizing 
the capitalized net revenue method." Brief of County at 9. The 
County implies that since the capitalized net revenue method was 
calculated and then discarded as being insufficient, it was still 
used. This is a meaningless point. The value of Kennecott's 
property was not arrived at by the application of the capitalized 
net revenue method. 
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summation method was used to value Kennecott's property in 1988 
because its application resulted in a higher value than the capi-
talized net revenue method. 
Use of the summation method instead of the capitalized 
net revenue method is significant because the Tax Commissions' 
decision was based upon the false conclusion that Kennecott was 
valued using the capitalized net revenue method. In its findings 
of fact, the Commission stated: 
13. The assessment of Kennecott was not 
made by using either the comparable sales 
method or the cost appraisal method, but was 
made by using the capitalized net revenue 
method. (emphasis added) 
14. The capitalized net revenue method 
calculates fair market value without any con-
sideration to transactional costs, i.e., it 
assumes that the fair market value is avail-
able to the owner without incurring transac-
tional costs. 
In its conclusions of law, the Commission stated: 
8. The Legislature has made a determi-
nation that when fair market value is calcu-
lated by using either the comparable sales 
method or the cost appraisal method there are 
transaction costs which have been included as 
part of the determined value. The Legisla-
ture has also made the determination that 
when fair market value is calculated by any 
other method, such as the capitalized net 
revenue method, there are no transaction 
costs which have been included as part of the 
determined value. (emphasis added) 
9. . . . The Legislature has deter-
mined that centrally assessed properties, 
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including mine properties such as Petition-
er /s# are to be assessed by the Commission 
using methods other than the comparable sales 
method or the cost appraisal method. Those 
centrally assessed property valuation meth-
ods, including the capitalized net revenue 
method, have been determined to not include 
transaction costs in the calculation of fair 
market value. The Legislature has, there-
fore , specifically excluded properties such 
as that which is owned by the Petitioner from 
the operation of § 59-2-304 because of the 
difference in methodology. (emphasis added) 
Thus, the Commission's decision was based on the con-
clusion that Kennecott's property was valued using the capital-
ized net revenue method and not the cost appraisal or market 
method. This aspect of the Commission's decision simply misrep-
resents the facts. The evidence establishes that Kennecott's 
property was valued by the Commission using the summation method 
which consisted solely of standard cost and market methods. See 
Brief of Petitioner at 17-19. 
II. THE COMMISSION USED THE SAME STANDARD METHODS 
USED BY THE COUNTY TO VALUE KENNECOTT'S 
PROPERTY. 
Both the Commission and the County unequivocally state 
that the evidence at the formal hearing "overwhelmingly" supports 
the position that the methods used by the County and the 
-3-
Commission are not the same. However, the only identified dis-
tinction between the methods used by the Commission to value Ken-
necott/s property in 1988 and methods employed by the County is 
the County's assertion that if it were valuing Kennecott's land 
using the summation method, it would value the minerals located 
within Kennecott's property either by using comparable sales or 
by making adjustments to comparable sales of non-mining property 
to reflect mineral values. See Brief of Commission, p. 13, cit-
ing Transcript at p. 101-02. 
This alleged distinction does not rise to the level of 
a different valuation method; rather, it is only a different 
application of the standard market method employed by county and 
state assessors. Additionally, neither the County nor the Com-
mission asserts that the application of the cost method used by 
the Commission to value Kennecott's property, i.e., the replace-
ment cost new less depreciation method, is not identical to the 
method routinely used by the County. See Brief of Petitioner at 
20-27. 
2
 Both the Commission and the County claim that Kennecott did 
not adequately marshal the evidence to show that the methods used 
by the Commission and County were the same. See, Brief of Com-
mission, p. 6; Brief of County, p. 6. Kennecott's brief, how-
ever, cites extensively from the record to show that the methods 
used by the respective agencies were the same. See, Brief of 
Petitioner, pp. 15-27. 
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Consequently, this Court's analysis in Amax Magnesium 
Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 
1990), is controlling. In Amax, the Utah Supreme Court deter-
mined that the cost appraisal method used by state assessors "did 
not differ in basic theory from the cost appraisal method used by 
county assessors." Id. at 1261. Consequently, the court stated: 
It strains reason to assert that if 
assessors using the cost and market appraisal 
methods overvalue county properties, the same 
overvaluation would not occur with state 
properties appraised by the same methods. 
Assuming that the legislature was correct in 
determining that the market value appraisal 
method overvalues property by 20 percent, it 
would be unconstitutional to apply [the 20% 
Statute] to county-assessed properties and 
not to state-assessed properties. Applying 
[the 20% Statute] to the facts of this case, 
we hold that it would be in violation of the 
constitutional mandate of article XIII, sec-
tions 2 and 3 that all property be taxed in a 
uniform and equal manner if [the 20% Statute] 
is not applied to Amax's property. 
Id. at 1260. Further, the court stated: 
If county properties assessed by the cost 
appraisal method receive a 20 percent reduc-
tion and state properties assessed by the 
same method receive no reduction, then [the 
20% Statute] has created two classes of prop-
erties assessed by the cost appraisal method 
and arbitrarily discriminated against one 
class merely because it is a state-assessed 
property. This disparity does not pass the 
constitutional muster set out in Blue Cross.3 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 
1989) . 
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Indeed, there is no reasonable basis for the 
classification of county properties assessed 
by the cost appraisal method versus 
state-assessed properties assessed by similar 
methods. The objectives of [the 20% Statute] 
are not met when the same method is used for 
both state and county assessments. (footnote 
added). 
Id. at 1261. 
The same is true with Kennecott. Because the capital-
ized net revenue method, in the Commission's opinion, did not 
result in 100% of the fair market value of Kennecott's property, 
the Commission did not employ that method. Instead, the Commis-
sion used the same standard methods that the County used. As in 
Amax, there is no justification for treating Kennecott differ-
ently only because it is mining property. 
III. DISTINCTIONS IN METHODOLOGIES EMPHASIZED BY THE 
COMMISSION AND COUNTY ARE IMMATERIAL SINCE THE 
COUNTY DEDUCTED 20% FROM ALL PROPERTY'S FAIR MAR-
KET VALUE, REGARDLESS OF APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY. 
Both the County and the Commission assert that had the 
County assessed Kennecott's property, it would have done the 
assessment differently than did the Commission. See Brief of 
Commission at 12-13; Brief of County at 9-13. They then conclude 
this somehow demonstrates that Kennecott was not unlawfully dis-
criminated against when the Commission did not extend to 
Kennecott the 20% reduction for intangibles which was extended by 
the County to all locally assessed real property. 
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The logic of this leap of faith escapes Kennecott. The 
facts are: (1) the County granted a 20% reduction in value to 
account for intangibles to all locally assessed real property, 
regardless of the method employed to arrive at that property's 
fair market value. See Brief of Petitioner at 28-30; (2) the 
Commission did not grant to Kennecott's property a similar 20% 
value reduction to account for intangibles even though the meth-
ods employed to value Kennecott's property were identical to the 
methods employed by the County to value many locally assessed 
real properties to which the 20% reduction was granted; and 
(3) by stipulation of all parties Kennecott's property, as of 
January 1# 1988, was valued at 100% of that property's fair mar-
4 ket value. See Brief of Petitioner at 27, citing Record at 
203-04. 
Therefore, by stipulation the parties have agreed that 
Kennecott's property in 1988 was assessed at $617,771,073 and 
that this sum represented the full fair market value of Kenne-
cott 7s property. Additionally, the County has admitted that the 
2 0% statute was applied to all county-assessed real property 
4
 To be consistent, had the County assessed Kennecott's prop-
erty and assigned a fair market value, which by stipulation is 
the value assigned by the Commission as of January 1, 1988, the 
County, in order to treat Kennecott's property the same as all 
other locally assessed property, would have extended to Kennecott 
a 20% reduction. This is exactly what Kennecott is seeking. 
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regardless of the valuation method used. Consequently, the Coun-
ty's claim that it would have valued Kennecott's property using a 
different methodology than that applied by the Commission is 
irrelevant. 
IV. THE ALLOWANCE OF A 14% REDUCTION TO STATE-ASSESSED 
RAILROAD PROPERTY BUT NOT TO KENNECOTT'S STATE-
ASSESSED PROPERTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
637 (Utah 1989), the Court stated that the uniform operation of 
laws requirement of the Utah Constitution in Article I, Section 
24, was substantially similar to the federal Equal Protection 
Clause and that the Court's analysis under the Utah Constitu-
tional provision was at least a rigorous as that required by the 
federal Constitution. 
The purpose of the uniform operation of laws require-
ment is to prevent the legislature from "classifying persons in 
such a manner that those who are similarly situated with respect 
to the purpose of the law are treated differently by that law, to 
the detriment of some of those so classified." Id. at 637 citing 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 752 
P.2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988); see also Amax, 796 P.2d at 1261. 
In this instance, Kennecott and the railroads are simi-
larly situated because they are both centrally-assessed taxpayers 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987) . Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 59-2-201(1) (1987) requires that all centrally-assessed prop-
erty be assessed by the Commission at 100% of fair market value. 
Because of the Commission's reduction in the assessed value of 
railroad property in 1988, however, Kennecott is assessed at 100% 
of its value, while the railroads are assessed and taxed at only 
5 86% of their property's value. 
The County's brief asserts that the basic fallacy in 
Kennecott's position is that Kennecott fails to recognize dis-
tinctions in property owners. Brief of County at 14. The Coun-
ty's brief cites Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 
488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989) as holding: "Equal protection in the 
context of taxation applies only to similarly situated property 
owners." Brief of County at 14. The County also cites Allegheny 
Pittsburgh as establishing that "the equal protection clause does 
not preclude a state from dividing different types of property 
into classes and applying different tax rates to each class, so 
long as the classifications and tax burdens are not designated in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner." Brief of County at 15-16. 
The County's argument is fallacious. The Utah Consti-
tution and Utah statute require the Commission to treat railroads 
5
 In 1988 by agreement with the railroads, the Commission 
reduced the assessed value of the railroads' property by 14%. It 
is Kennecott's understanding that this was done in order to com-
port with Juge Jenkins' decision in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission. 716 F. Supp. 453 (D. Utah 1988). 
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and Kennecott in the same fashion. Article XIII §§ 2 and 3 of 
the Utah Constitution requires all tangible property to be taxed 
at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987) requires all centrally-assessed prop-
erty to be assessed at 100% of fair market value. Under the Utah 
Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987), both Kennecott 
and the railroads belong to the same class of taxpayers. 
centrally-assessed. Thus, Kennecott and the railroads are simi-
larly situated taxpayers of the same class and the disparate 
treatment between the railroads and Kennecott violates Kenne-
cott' s rights under the U.S. Constitution, the Utah Constitution 
and under Utah statute. 
As this Court stated in Builders Components Supply Com-
pany v. Cockayne. 450 P.2d 97, 98 (Utah 1969), "the only power 
the assessor has to assess property is that delegated to him by 
the legislature." Here, the Commission has engaged in, and has 
refused to remedy, an unlawful classification by assessing rail-
road property at 86% of fair market value, while assessing Kenne-
cott1 s property at 100% of its value. Since both the Utah 
6
 The Builders Components Supply case has been recently cited 
as precedent by this Court in County Board of Equalization v. 
State Tax Commission. 789 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1990) and County 
Board of Equalization v. Nupetco Associates, 779 P.2d 1138, 1139 
(Utah 1989). 
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Constitution and Utah statute prohibit this classification, the 
Commission may not so classify property and, instead, must equal-
ize the valuation of Kennecott's property with that of the rail-
roads . 
The Commission, on the other hand, argues that the 
holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh is less relevant than the recent 
case of Nordlinger v. Hahn, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120 
7 . . . 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) which the Commission claims supports its argu-
ment that Kennecott may be forced to bear a larger tax burden as 
long as the different treatment is related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest. Brief of Commission at 22-26. Addition-
ally, , the Commission claims that the case cited by Kennecott, 
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Board of Egualizationf 443 N.W.2d 249 
(Neb. 1989) relies upon outdated cases, while Federal Express 
Corporation v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, 717 S.W.2d 
873 (Tenn. 1986) is more persuasive. In Federal Express, the 
court held that the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform 
Act ("4-R Act") preempted Tennessee#s classification of railroads 
as utilities and required them to be taxed at the lower rate 
applicable to industrial and commercial property. The court 
denied Federal Express' claim that the reduction in rate for the 
7
 Nordlinger was decided on June 18, 1992, the day after Ken-
necott7 s brief was filed. A copy of the case is included in the 
Addendum. 
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railroads violated Federal Express' equal protection rights since 
Federal Express was assessed as a utility. 
Allegheny Pittsburgh and Northern Natural Gas are more 
persuasive than Nordlinger and Federal Express. In Allegheny 
Pittsburgh, the Court ruled that Webster County's acquisition 
value system of taxation was unconstitutional because it was 
inconsistent with West Virginia's constitutional and statutory 
scheme requiring all property to be taxed at a uniform rate 
throughout state according to its estimated value. See 488 U.S. 
at 345. 
In Nordlinger, however, the Court ruled that Califor-
nia's acquisition value system of taxation, which was based on an 
amendment to the State Constitution, was constitutional. The 
Nordlinger Court distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh because Cali-
fornia's tax scheme was not designed to tax at a uniform rate 
according to market value. 
Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA 
cannot be distinguished from the tax assess-
ment practice found to violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh. Like 
Article XIIIA, the practice at issue in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh resulted in dramatic 
disparities in taxation of properties of com-
parable value. But an obvious and critical 
factual difference between this case and 
8
 An acquisition value system sets the assessed value of prop-
erty based upon its most recent sales price. Therefore, similar 
properties may be assessed at substantially different values 
depending on when the properties were last sold. 
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Allegheny Pittsburgh is the absence of any 
indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the 
policies underlying an acquisition-value tax-
ation scheme could conceivably have been the 
purpose for the Webster County tax assessor's 
unequal assessment scheme. In the first 
place, Webster County argued that "its 
assessment scheme is rationally related to 
its purpose of assessing properties at true 
current value" [emphasis added by the Court]. 
Id. . at 488 U.S., at 343 [footnote omitted]. 
Moreover, the West Virginia "Constitution and 
laws provide that all property of the kind 
held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate 
uniform throughout the State according to its 
estimated market value," and the Court found 
"no suggestion" that "the State may have 
adopted a different system in practice from 
that specified by statute." Id., at 345. 
60 U.S.L.W. at 4567. Consequently, since Utah, by its Constitu-
tion and statutory scheme, in a fashion similar to West Virginia, 
mandates taxation based upon a tax rate applied uniformly to the 
fair market value of all property, the Allegheny Pittsburgh anal-
ysis is more persuasive. 
Similarly, Northern Natural Gas is more persuasive than 
Federal Express. In Northern Natural Gas the court lowered the 
petitioner's assessment to equalize it with the reduction granted 
by the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska 
to railroads in order to comply with the 4-R Act. See Brief of 
Petitioner at 40-42. The basis for this decision was the 
requirement in Nebraska's Constitution that taxes were to be 
-13-
levied uniformly upon all tangible property. See 443 N.W.2d at 
255-56.9 
In Federal Express, however, the court considered Ten-
nessee's Constitution which specifically authorized separate 
property classifications for ad valorem tax purposes. See 717 
S.W.2d at 874. Pursuant to that provision, Tennessee's law 
required public utilities' property to be taxed at 55% of their 
value while other commercial and industrial property was taxed at 
30% of its value. The court held that the District Court's 
decision preempted the classification of railroads as utilities. 
See id. at 876 (Congress, via the 4-R Act," preempted the state 
classification of railroads as utilities and provided that they 
9
 Both the Commission's and County's attempts to distinguish 
Northern Natural Gas are unsuccessful. The County states: "It 
is important to note, however, that both the railroad and the 
petitioner were public utilities, subject to federal law and hav-
ing interstate connections." Brief of County at 20. This is not 
a meaningful distinction identified as a factor in the case. 
The Commission criticizes Northern Natural Gas for relying 
upon outdated cases, for not citing Allegheny Pittsburgh, and for 
not analyzing the legitimate purpose of the 4-R Act. The alleged 
outdated cases, Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 
(1923) and Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918) 
were both cited as precedents in Allegheny Pittsburgh. See 488 
U.S. at 345. Additionally, the court in Northern Natural Gas had 
no need to question or determine the legitimate purpose of the 
4-R Act. 
1 0
 All other property, i.e. residential property, was taxed at 
5% of its value. See id. The Tennessee Constitution did require 
the taxation within each class to be uniform. See id. 
-14-
should be taxed as industrial and commercial property are 
taxed.") 
Since Utah requires uniform taxation of all tangible 
property according to its fair market value, Allegheny Pittsburgh 
and Northern Natural Gas are more persuasive than Nordlinger and 
Federal Express. Based upon these decisions, Kennecott's prop-
erty should be equalized with the railroads requiring a 14% 
reduction in the value of Kennecott's property. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, Kennecott is entitled to: (1) a 
20% reduction in the assessed value of its real property as 
granted in Amax; or in the alternative, (2) a 14% reduction in 
assessed value of its real and personal property as was granted 
to the railroads as a result of Union Pacific. 
DATED this y^—day of September, 1992. 
JAMES B. LEE 
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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5] The United States 
Law Week 
June 16, 1992 THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC.. WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Extra Edition No. 1 
Supreme Court 
Opinions 
Volume 60. No. 49 
OPINIONS ANNOUNCED JUNE 18, 1992 
The Supreme Court decided: 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—Juries 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
criminal defendants from exercising peremptory challenges on 
basis of race; procedure set out in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79 (1986), for resolving defense claims that prosecution has 
employed racially discriminatory peremptory challenges also 
applies when such claims are raised by state in criminal trial. 
(Georgia v. McCollum, No. 91-372) Page 4574 
TAXATION—Corporate Income Tax 
Iowa corporate income tax scheme that allows corporations to 
take deduction for dividends received from domestic, but not 
foreign, subsidiaries facially discriminates against foreign com-
merce in violation of Foreign Commerce Clause. (Kraft General 
Foods Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, No. 90-
1918) Page 4582 
Ful l Text of Opin ions 
No. 90-1912 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH—Pre-emption 
Section 18(b) of Occupational Safety and Health Act, provid-
ing that states "shall" submit plan for federal approval if they 
wish to "assume responsibility" for development and enforce-
ment of occupational safety and health standards in area already 
covered by federal standard, pre-empts all non-approved state 
occupational safety and health standards relating to issue gov-
erned by federal standard; state law requirement that directly, 
substantially, and specifically regulates occupational safety and 
health is occupational safety and health standard within mean-
ing of OSH Act, for purposes of pre-emption analysis, even if it 
has additional purpose unrelated to occupational health and 
safety. (Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Associ-
ation, No. 90-1676) . ' . . . . Page 4587 
TAXATION—Property Taxes 
California constitutional provision that bases real property 
assessments on acquisition cost rather than current market 
value, thereby disproportionately burdening recent purchasers of 
real property and favoring longtime property owners in inflation-
ary market, rationally furthers legitimate state interests in 
preserving and stabilizing neighborhoods and in recognizing 
longtime owners' greater reliance interests warranting protection 
against higher taxes, and therefore does not violate Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause; exemptions for home-
owners over age 55 who exchange their principal residences and 
for children who acquire property from their parents rationally 
further legitimate state interest in encouraging stability of 
ownership among these groups, and therefore do not violate 
Equal Protection Clause; taxpayer who was California resident 
before she acquired her property lacks standing to assert in-
fringement of constitutional right to travel as basis for according 
heightened scrutiny to her equal protection claim. (Nordlinger 
v. Hahn, No. 90-1912) Page 4563 
STEPHANIE NORDLINGER, PETITIONER v. 
KENNETH H A H N , IN HIS CAPACITY AS TAX 
ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, ET AL. 
OK WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
Syllabus 
No. 90-1912. Argued February 25, 1992—Decided June 18, 1992 
In response to rapidly rising real property taxes, California voters 
approved a statewide ballot initiative, Proposition 13, which added 
Article XIIIA to the State Constitution. Among other things, Article 
XIIlA embodies an "acquisition value" system of taxation, whereby 
property is reassessed up to current appraised value upon new 
construction or a change in ownership. Exemptions from this reas-
sessment provision exist for two types of transfers: exchanges of 
principal residences by persons over the age of 55 and transfers 
between parents and children. Over time, the acquisition-valud 
system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons 
owning similar pieces of property. Longer-term owners pay lower 
taxes reflecting historic property values, while newer owners pay 
higher taxes reflecting more recent values. Faced with such a 
disparity, petitioner, a former Los Angeles apartment renter who had 
recently purchased a house in Los Angeles County, filed suit against 
respondents, the county and its tax assessor, claiming that Article 
XIIlA's reassessment scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The County Superior Court dismissed 
the complaint without leave to amend, and the State Court of Appeal 
affirmed. 
Held: Article XIIIA's acquisition-value assessment scheme does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
(a) Unless a state-imposed classification warrants some form of 
heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental 
right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteris-
tic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification 
rationally further a legitimate state interest. 
(b) Petitioner may not assert the constitutional right to travel as 
a basis for heightened review of Article XIIIA. Her complaint does 
not allege that she herself has been impeded from traveling or from 
settling in California because, before purchasing her home, she 
already lived in Los Angeles. Prudential standing principles prohibit-
JSOTE: Where it is deemed desirable, a syllabus (headnote) will be released 
* • at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
NOTICE: These opinions are subject to formal revision before publication in 
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washing-
~ ^f n^f «»«vw»ranKirt»l nr Attw»r formal MTOTS. in Order that — r\ r> «>A<ii i 
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ing a litigant's raising another person's legal rights may not be 
overlooked in this case, since petitioner has not identified any 
obstacle preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California 
from asserting claims on their own, nor shown any special relation-
ship with those whose rights she seeks to assert. 
(c) In permitting longer-term owners to pay less in taxes than 
newer owners of comparable property, Article XIIlA's assessment 
scheme rationally furthers at least two legitimate state interests. 
First, because the State has a legitimate interest in local neighbor-
hood preservation, continuity, and stability, it legitimately can decide 
to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership 
of homes and businesses. Second, the State legitimately can conclude 
that a new owner, at the point of purchasing his property, does not 
have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher 
taxes as does an existing owner, who is already saddled with his 
purchase and does not have the option of deciding not to buy his 
home if taxes become prohibitively high. 
(d) Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster, 488 U. S. 336, is not 
controlling here, since the facts of that case precluded any plausible 
inference that the purpose of the tax assessment practice there 
invalidated was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax 
scheme. 
(e) Article XJIIA's two reassessment exemptions rationally further 
legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably could have 
concluded that older persons in general should not be discouraged 
from exchanging their residences for ones more suitable to their 
changing family sizes or incomes, and that the interests of family and 
neighborhood continuity and stability are furthered by and warrant 
an exemption for transfers between parents and children. 
(0 Because Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, this Court must 
decline petitioner's request to invalidate it, even if it may appear to 
be improvident and unwise yet unlikely ever to be reconsidered or 
repealed by ordinary democratic processes. 
25 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684, affirmed. 
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHN-
|U1ST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, 
J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part II-A. THOMAS, 
., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
tTEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In 1978, California voters staged what has been described 
is a property tax revolt1 by approving a statewide ballot 
nitiative known as Proposition 13. The adoption of 
Voposition 13 served to amend the California Constitution 
o impose strict limits on the rate at which real property is 
axed and on the rate at which real property assessments 
j*e increased from year to year. In this litigation, we 
onsider a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of 
he Fourteenth Amendment to the manner in which real 
property now is assessed under the California Constitution. 
I 
A 
Proposition 13 followed many years of rapidly rising real 
iroperty taxes in California. From fiscal years 1967-1968 
o 1971-1972, revenues from these taxes increased on an 
verage of 11.5 percent per year. See Report of the Senate 
/Ommission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the 
)alifornia State Senate 23 (1991). In response, the Califor-
ia Legislature enacted several property tax relief mea-
ures, including a cap on tax rates in 1972. Id., at 23-24. 
'he boom in the State's real estate market persevered, 
'See N.Y. Times, June 8,1978, p. 23, col. 1; Washington Post, June 11, 
978. p. HI. 
however, and the median price of an existing home doubled 
from $31,530 in 1973 to $62,430 in 1977. As a result, tax 
levies continued to rise because of sharply increasing 
assessment values. Id., at 23. Some homeowners saw then-
tax bills double or triple during this period, well outpacing 
any growth in their income and ability to pay. Id.t at 25. 
See also Oakland, Proposition 13—Genesis and Conse-
quences, 32 Nat. Tax J. 387, 392 (Supp. June 1979). 
By 1978, property tax relief had emerged as a major 
political issue in California. In only one month's time, tax 
relief advocates collected over 1.2 million signatures to 
qualify Proposition 13 for the June 1978 ballot. See Lefcoe 
& Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador 
Valley Case, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1978). On election 
day, Proposition 13 received a favorable vote of 64.8 percent 
and carried 55 of the State's 58 counties. California 
Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement, 
Primary Election, June 6, 1978, p. 39. California thus had 
a novel constitutional amendment that led to a property tax 
cut of approximately $7 billion in the first year. Senate 
Commission Report, at 28. A California homeowner with a 
$50,000 home enjoyed an immediate reduction of about 
$750 per year in property taxes. Id, at 26. 
As enacted by Proposition 13, Article XIIIA of the 
California Constitution caps real property taxes at 1% of a 
property's "full cash value." § 1(a). "Full cash value" is 
defined as the assessed valuation as of the 1975-1976 tax 
year or, "thereafter, the appraised value of real property 
when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in owner-
ship has occurred after the 1975 assessment." §2(a). The 
assessment "may reflect from year to year the inflationary 
rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year." §2(b). 
Article XIIIA also contains several exemptions from this 
reassessment provision. One exemption authorizes the 
legislature to allow homeowners over the age of 55 who sell 
their principal residences to carry their previous base-year 
assessments with them to replacement residences of equal 
or lesser value. §2(a). A second exemption applies to 
transfers of a principal residence (and up to $1 million of 
other real property) between parents and children. § 2(h). 
In short, Article XIIIA combines a 1% ceiling on the 
property tax rate with a 2% cap on annual increases in 
assessed valuations. The assessment limitation, however, 
is subject to the exception that new construction or a 
change of ownership triggers a reassessment up to current 
appraised value. Thus, the assessment provisions of Article 
XIIIA essentially embody an "acquisition value" system of 
taxation rather than the more commonplace "current value" 
taxation. Real property is assessed at values related to the 
value of the property at the time it is acquired by the 
taxpayer rather than to the value it has in the current real 
estate market. 
Over time, this acquisition-value system has created 
dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons owning 
similar pieces of property. Property values in California 
have inflated far in excess of the allowed 2% cap on 
increases in assessments for property that is not newly 
constructed or that has not changed hands. See Senate 
Commission Report, at 31-32. As a result, longer-term 
property owners pay lower property taxes reflecting historic 
property values, while newer owners pay higher property 
taxes reflecting more recent values. For that reason, 
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Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a "welcome 
stranger" system—the newcomer to an established commu-
nity is "welcome" in anticipation that he will contribute a 
larger percentage of support for local government than his 
settled neighbor who owns a comparable home. Indeed, in 
dollar terms, the differences in tax burdens are staggering. 
By 1989, the 44% of CaUfomia home owners who have 
owned their homes since enactment of Proposition 13 in 
1978 shouldered only 25% of the more than $4 billion in 
residential property taxes paid by homeowners statewide. 
Id., at 33. If property values continue to rise more than the 
annual 2% inflationary cap, this disparity will continue to 
grow. g 
According to her amended complaint, petitioner Stephanie 
Nordlinger in November 1988 purchased a house in the 
Baldwin Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles County for 
$170,000. App. 5. The prior owners bought the home just 
two years before for $121,500. Id., at 6. Before her 
purchase, petitioner had lived in a rented apartment in Los 
Angeles and had not owned any real property in California. 
Id., at 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. 
In early 1989, petitioner received a notice from the Los 
Angeles County Tax Assessor, who is a respondent here, 
informing her that her home had been reassessed upward 
to $170,100 on account of its change in ownership. App. 7. 
She learned that the reassessment resulted in a property 
tax increase of $453.60, up 36% to $1,701, for the 
1988-1989 fiscal year. Ibid. 
Petitioner later discovered she was paying about five 
times more in taxes than some of her neighbors who owned 
comparable homes since 1975 within the same residential 
development. For example, one block away, a house of 
identical size on a lot slightly larger than petitioner's was 
subject to a general tax levy of only $358.20 (based on an 
assessed valuation of $35,820, which reflected the home's 
value in 1975 plus the up-to-2% per year inflation factor). 
Id., at 9-10.2 According to petitioner, her total property 
taxes over the first 10 years in her home will approach 
$19,000, while any neighbor who bought a comparable 
home in 1975 stands to pay just $4,100. Brief for Petitioner 
3. The general tax levied against her modest home is only 
a few dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a 
$2.1 million Malibu beachfront home. App. 24. 
After exhausting administrative remedies, petitioner 
brought suit against respondents in Los Angeles County 
Superior Court. She sought a tax refund and a declaration 
that her tax was unconstitutional.3 In her amended 
complaint, she alleged: "Article XIIIA has created an 
arbitrary system which assigns disparate real property tax 
Petitioner proffered to the trial court additional evidence suggesting 
that the disparities in residential tax burdens were greater in other Los 
Angeles County neighborhoods. For example, a small 2-bedroom house 
in Santa Monica that was previously assessed at $27,000 and that was 
sold for $465,000 in 1989 would be subject to a tax levy of $4,650, a bill 
17 times more than the $270 paid the year before by the previous owner. 
App. 76-77. Petitioner also proffered evidence suggesting that similar 
disparities obtained with respect to apartment buildings and commercial 
and industrial income-producing properties. Id., at 68-69, 82-85. 
California by statute grants a cause of action to a taxpayer "where the 
alleged illegal or unconstitutional assessment or collection occurs as the 
direct result of a change in administrative regulations or statutory or 
constitutional law that became effective not more than 12 months prior 
to the date the action is initiated by the taxpayer." Cal. Rev. & Tax. 
Code Ann. §4808 (West 1987). Although Proposition 13 was enacted 11 
years before she filed her complaint, petitioner contended that the 
burdens on owners of generally comparable and similarly 
situated properties without regard to the use of the real 
property taxed, the burden the property places on govern-
ment, the actual value of the property or the financial 
capability of the property owner." Id., at 12. Respondents 
demurred. W.,at l4 . By minute order, the Superior Court 
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint 
without leave to amend. App. to Pet. for Cert. D2. 
The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Nordlinger v. 
Lynch, 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990). It 
noted that the Supreme Court of California already had 
rejected a constitutional challenge to the disparities in 
taxation resulting from Article XIIIA. See Amador Valley 
Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
22 Cal.3d 208,583 P.2d 1281 (1978). Characterizing Article 
XIIIA as an "acquisition value" system, the Court of Appeal 
found it survived equal protection review, because it was 
supported by at least two rational bases: first, it prevented 
property taxes from reflecting unduly inflated and unfore-
seen current values, and, second, it allowed property owners 
to estimate future liability with substantial certainty. 225 
Cal.App.3d, at 1273, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 691-692 (citing 
Amador, 22 Cal.3d, at 235, 583 P.2d, at 1293). 
The Court of Appeal also concluded that this Court's more 
recent decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster 
County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), did not warrant a different 
result. At issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh was the practice of 
a West Virginia county tax assessor of assessing recently 
purchased property on the basis of its purchase price, while 
making only minor modifications in the assessments of 
property that had not recently been sold. Properties that 
had been sold recently were reassessed and taxed at values 
between 8 and 35 times that of properties that had not been 
sold. Id., at 341. This Court determined that the unequal 
assessment practice violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court of Appeal distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh 
on grounds that "California has opted for an assessment 
method based on each individual owner's acquisition cost," 
while, "[i]n marked contrast, the West Virginia Constitution 
requires property to be taxed at a uniform rate statewide 
according to its estimated current market value" (emphasis 
in original). 225 Cal.App.3d, at 1277-1278, 275 Cal. Rptr., 
at 695. Thus, the Court of Appeal found: "Allegheny does 
not prohibit the states from adopting an acquisition value 
assessment method. That decision merely prohibits the 
arbitrary enforcement of a current value assessment 
method" (emphasis omitted). Id., at 1265, 275 Cal. Rptr., 
at 686. 
The Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner's argument 
that the effect of Article XIIIA on the constitutional right to 
travel warranted heightened equal protection review. The 
court determined that the right to travel was not infringed, 
because Article XIIIA "bases each property owner's assess-
ment on acquisition value, irrespective of the owner's status 
as a California resident or the owner's length of residence 
in the state." Id., at 1281, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697. Any 
benefit to longtime California residents was deemed 
"incidental" to an acquisition-value approach. Finally, the 
Court of Appeal found its conclusion was unchanged by the 
exemptions in Article XIIIA. Ibid., 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697. 
The Supreme Court of California denied review. App. to 
Pet. for Cert. Bl. We granted certiorari. U. S. 
(1991). 
before petitioner filed her amended complaint. Because the California 
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II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, §1, commands that no State shall "deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion 
between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause 
does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmen-
tal decisionmakers from treating differently persons who 
are in all relevant respects alike. F.S. Royster Guano Co. 
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). 
As a general rule, "legislatures are presumed to have 
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact 
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961). 
Accordingly, this Court's cases are clear that, unless a 
classification warrants some form of heightened review 
because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or 
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect character-
istic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the 
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest. 
See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 
432, 439-441 (1985); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 
303 (1976). 
A 
At the outset, petitioner suggests that her challenge to 
Article XIIIA qualifies for heightened scrutiny because it 
infringes upon the constitutional right to travel. See, e.g., 
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982); Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 254-256 
(1976). In particular, petitioner alleges that the exemptions 
to reassessment for transfers by owners over 55 and for 
transfers between parents and children run afoul of the 
right to travel, because they classify directly on the basis of 
California residency. But the complaint does not allege 
that petitioner herself has been impeded from traveling or 
from settling in California because, as has been noted, prior 
to purchasing her home, petitioner lived in an apartment in 
Los Angeles. This Court's prudential standing principles 
impose a "general prohibition on a litigant's raising another 
person's legal rights." Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 
1984). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 
163, 166 (1972). Petitioner has not identified any obstacle 
preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California 
rom asserting claims on their own behalf, nor has she 
shown any special relationship with those whose rights she 
>eeks to assert, such that we might overlook this prudential 
imitation. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 
517, 623, n. 3 (1989). Accordingly, petitioner may not 
issert the constitutional right to travel as a basis for 
leightened review. 
B 
The appropriate standard of review is whether the 
lifference in treatment between newer and older owners 
ationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In general, 
he Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is 
L plausible policy reason for the classification, see United 
Uates Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,174, 
79 (1980), the legislative facts on which the classification 
s apparently based rationally may have been considered to 
>e true by the governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota 
. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 464 (1981), and 
he relationship of the classification to its goal is not so 
ttenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irratio-
context of classifications made by complex tax laws. "[I]n 
structuring internal taxation schemes 'the States have large 
leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which 
in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation." 
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22 (1985), quoting 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 
359 (1973). See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation 
of Washington, 461 U. S. 540, 547 (1983) ("Legislatures 
have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and 
distinctions in tax statutes"). 
As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does 
not discriminate with respect to either the tax rate or the 
annual rate of adjustment in assessments. Newer and older 
owners alike benefit in both the short and long run from 
the protections of a 1% tax rate ceiling and no more than a 
2% increase in assessment value per year. New owners and 
old owners are treated differently with respect to one factor 
only—the basis on which their property is initially assessed. 
Petitioner's true complaint is that the State has denied 
her—a new owner—the benefit of the same assessment 
value that her neighbors—older owners—enjoy. 
We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational 
or reasonable considerations of difference or policy that 
justify denying petitioner the benefits of her neighbors* 
lower assessments. First, the State has a legitimate 
interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and 
stability. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). 
The State therefore legitimately can decide to structure its 
tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership of 
homes and businesses, for example, in order to inhibit 
displacement of lower income families by the forces of 
gentrification or of established, "mom-and-pop" businesses 
by newer chain operations. By permitting older owners to 
pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of compa-
rable property, the Article XIIIA assessment scheme 
rationally furthers this interest. 
Second, the State legitimately can conclude that a new 
owner at the time of acquiring his property does not have 
the same reliance interest warranting protection against 
higher taxes as does an existing owner. The State may 
deny a new owner at the point of purchase the right to "lock 
in" to the same assessed value as is enjoyed by an existing 
owner of comparable property, because an existing owner 
rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in 
his property or home that are more deserving of protection 
than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the 
point of purchase. A new owner has full information about 
the scope of future tax liability before acquiring the 
property, and if he thinks the future tax burden is too 
demanding, he can decide not to complete the purchase at 
all. By contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with 
his purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to 
buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high. To meet 
his tax obligations, he might be forced to sell his home or to 
divert his income away from the purchase of food, clothing, 
and other necessities. In short, the State may decide that 
it is worse to have owned and lost, than never to have 
owned at all. 
This Court previously has acknowledged that classifica-
tions serving to protect legitimate expectation and reliance 
interests do not deny equal protection of the laws.4 "The 
protection of reasonable reliance interests is not only a 
'Outside the context of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has not 
hesitated to recognize the legitimacy of protecting reliance and expecta-
tion^ interests. See, e.g., Rakas v. IlUnois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978) 
\9-l\w ' — 
legitimate governmental objective: it provides an exceeding-
ly persuasive justification. . . ." (internal quotations omit-
ted). Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 746 (1984). For 
example, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U. S. 
450 (1988), the Court determined that a prohibition on user 
fees for bus service in "reorganized" school districts but not 
in "nonreorganized" school districts does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, because "the legislature could 
conceivably have believed that such a policy would serve 
the legitimate purpose of fulfilling the reasonable expecta-
tions of those residing in districts with free busing arrange-
ments imposed by reorganization plans." Id., at 465. 
Similarly, in United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 
supra, the Court determined that a denial of dual "windfall" 
retirement benefits to some railroad workers but not others 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because 
"Congress could properly conclude that persons who had 
actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits 
while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater 
equitable claim to those benefits than the members of 
appellee's class who were no longer in railroad employment 
when they became eligible for dual benefits." 449 U. S., at 
178. Finally, in New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, the Court 
determined that an ordinance banning certain street-vendor 
operations, but grandfathering existing vendors who had 
been in operation for more than eight years, did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause because the "city could reason-
ably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have 
built up substantial reliance interests in continued opera-
tion." 427 U. S., at 305.5 
Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA cannot be distin-
guished from the tax assessment practice found to violate 
the Equal Protection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh. Like 
Article XIIIA, the practice at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
resulted in dramatic disparities in taxation of properties of 
comparable value. But an obvious and critical factual 
difference between this case and Allegheny Pittsburgh is the 
absence of any indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the 
policies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme 
could conceivably have been the purpose for the Webster 
County tax assessor's unequal assessment scheme. In the 
first place, Webster County argued that "its assessment 
scheme is rationally related to its purpose of assessing 
properties at true current value" (emphasis added). Id., at 
488 U. S., at 343.6 Moreover, the West Virginia "Constitu-
expectation of privacy in the invaded place"); Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (whether regulation 
of property constitutes a "taking* depends in part on "the extent tn which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions"); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (state law 
"property" interest for purpose of federal due process denotes "interests 
that are secured by existing rules or understandings") (internal 
quotations omitted). 
*Because we conclude that Article XIIIA rationally furthers the State's 
interests in neighborhood stability and the protection of property owners' 
reliance interests, we need not consider whether it permissibly serves 
other interests discussed by the parties, including whether it taxes real 
property according to the taxpayers' ability to pay or whether it taxes 
real property in such a way as to promote stability of local tax revenues. 
6Webster County argued that the outdated assessments it used were 
consistent with current-value taxation, because periodic upward 
adjustments were made for inflation and it was not feasible to reassess 
individually each piece of property every year. Although the county 
obliquely referred in a footnote to the advantages of historical cost 
accounting. Bnef for Respondent in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
Webster County. O.T. 1988, No. 87-1303, p. 30, n. 23, this was not an 
assertion of the general policies supporting acquisition-value taxation, 
hven if acquisition-value policies had been asserted, the assertion would 
have been nonsensical given its inherent inconsistency with the county's 
principal argument that it was m fact trying to promote current-value 
tion and laws provide that all property of the kind held by 
petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the 
State according to its estimated market value," and the 
Court found "no suggestion" that "the State may have 
adopted a different system in practice from that specified by 
statute." Id., at 345. 
To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand 
for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or 
governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the 
purpose or rationale supporting its classification. United 
Stades Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179. 
See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chica-
go, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969) (legitimate state purpose may 
be ascertained even when the legislative or administrative 
history is silent). Nevertheless, this Court's review does 
require that a purpose may conceivably or "may reasonably 
have been the purpose and policy" of the relevant govern-
mental decisionmaker. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 528-529 (1959). See also Schweiker 
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 235 (1981) (classificatory scheme 
must "rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable 
governmental objective" (emphasis added)). Allegheny 
Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any 
plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assess-
ment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-
value tax scheme.7 By contrast, Article XIIIA was enacted 
precisely to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value 
system. Allegheny Pittsburgh is not controlling here.8 
Finally, petitioner contends that the unfairness of Article 
XIIIA is made worse by its exemptions from reassessment 
for two special classes of new owners: persons aged 55 and 
older, who exchange principal residences, and children who 
acquire property from their parents. This Court previously 
has declined to hold that narrow exemptions from a general 
scheme of taxation necessarily render the overall scheme 
invidiously discriminatory. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. at 550-551 
(denial of tax exemption to nonprofit lobbying organizations, 
but with an exception for veterans' groups, does not violate 
equal protection). For purposes of rational-basis review, the 
"latitude of discretion is notably wide in . . . the granting of 
partial or total exemptions upon grounds of policy." F.S. 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S., at 415. 
The two exemptions at issue here rationally further 
legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably 
could have concluded that older persons in general should 
not be discouraged from moving to a residence more 
suitable to their changing family size or income. Similarly, 
7In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959), the 
Court distinguished on similar grounds its decision in Wheeling Steel 
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949), which invalidated a state 
statutory scheme exempting from taxation certain notes and accounts 
receivable owned by residents of the State but not notes and accounts 
receivable owned by nonresidents. 358 U. S., at 529. Alter the Court in 
Wheeling Steel determined that the statutory scheme's stated purpose 
was not legitimate, the other purposes did not need to be considered 
because *Thjaving themselves specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio 
statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence." 
Id, at 530. 
8In finding Allegheny Pittsburgh distinguishable, we do not suggest 
that the protections of the Equal Protection Clause are any less when the 
classification is drawn by legislative mandate, as in this case, than by 
administrative action as in Allegheny Pittsburgh. See Sunday Lake Iron 
Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 (1918). Nor do we suggest that the 
Equal Protection Clause constrains administrators, as in Allegheny 
Pittsburgh, from violating state law requiring uniformity of taxation of 
property. See Nashville. C. & St. L R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, 
368-370 (1940); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. King County, 264 
U. S. 22, 27-28 (1924). See generally Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 
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the people of California reasonably could have concluded 
that the interests of family and neighborhood continuity 
and stability are furthered by and warrant an exemption for 
transfers between parents and children. Petitioner has not 
demonstrated that no rational bases lie for either of these 
exemptions. 
Ill 
Petitioner and amici argue with some appeal that Article 
XIIIA frustrates the "American dream" of home ownership 
for many younger and poorer California families. They 
argue that Article XIIIA places start-up businesses that 
depend on ownership of property at a severe disadvantage 
in competing with established businesses. They argue that 
Article XIIIA dampens demand for and construction of new 
housing and buildings. And they argue that Article XIIIA 
constricts local tax revenues at the expense of public 
education and vital services. 
Time and again, however, this Court has made clear in 
the rational-basis context that the "Constitution presumes 
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvi-
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwar-
ranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political 
branch has acted" (footnote omitted). Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U. S. 93, 97 (1979). Certainly, California's grand experi-
ment appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and 
entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court of Appeal 
surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to 
prompt its reconsideration or repeal. See 225 Cal. App. 3d, 
at 1282, n. 11, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 698, n. 11. Yet many wise 
and well-intentioned laws suffer from the same malady. 
Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline 
petitioner's request to upset the will of the people of 
California. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission 
of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), this Court struck 
down an assessment method used in Webster County, West 
Virginia, that operated precisely the same way as the 
California scheme being challenged today. I agree with the 
Court that Proposition 13 is constitutional. But I also agree 
with JUSTICE STEVENS that Allegheny Pittsburgh cannot be 
distinguished, see post, at 5. lb me Allegheny Pittsburgh 
•epresents a "needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on 
he State's legislative powers," New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 
J. S. 297, 306 (1976) (per curiam), and I write separately 
>ecause I see no benefit, and much risk, in refusing to 
onfront it directly. 
I 
Allegheny Pittsburgh involved a county assessment 
cheme indistinguishable in relevant respects from Proposi-
ion 13. As the Court explains, California taxes real 
iroperty at 19b of "full cash value," which means the 
assessed value" as of 1975 (under the previous method) 
nd after 1975-1976 the "appraised value of real property 
/hen purchased, newly constructed, or a change in value 
ias occurred after the 1975 assessment." The assessed 
alue may be increased for inflation, but only at a maxi-
XIIIA, §§ 1(a), 2(a); ante, at 2. The property tax system 
worked much the same way in Webster County, West 
Virginia. The tax assessor assigned real property an 
"appraised value," set the "assessed value" at half of the 
appraised value, then collected taxes by multiplying the 
assessed value by the relevant tax rate. For property that 
had been sold recently, the assessor set the appraised value 
at the most recent price of purchase. For property that had 
not been sold recently, she increased the appraised price by 
10%, first in 1976, then again in 1981 and 1983. 
l ne assessor's methods resulted in "dramatic differences 
in valuation between . . . recently transferred property and 
otherwise comparable surrounding land." 488 U. S., at 341; 
cf. Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 261, 269-270 (1990) (discussing the effects of 
Proposition 13); Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A 
Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County 
Commission, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 87, 91, and n. 29 (1990); 
Hellerstein & Peters, Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
Have Far-Reaching Implications, 70 J. Taxation 306, 
308-310 (1989). Several coal companies that owned 
property in Webster County sued the county assessor, 
alleging violations of both the West Virginia and the United 
States Constitutions. The Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia upheld the assessment against the compa-
nies, but this Court reversed. 
The Allegheny Pittsburgh Court asserted that with 
respect to taxation, the Equal Protection Clause constrains 
the States as follows. Although "|t]he use of a general 
adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual 
reappraisal violates no constitutional command," the Clause 
requires that "general adjustments [be] accurate enough 
over a short period of time to equalize the differences in 
proportion between the assessments of a class of property 
holders." 488 U. S., at 343. "[T]he constitutional require-
ment is the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in 
tax treatment of similarly situated property owners." Ibid. 
(citing Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 
526-527 (1959)). Moreover, the Court stated, the Constitu-
tion and laws of West Virginia "provide that all property of 
the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform 
throughout the State according to its estimated market 
value," and "[t]here [was] no suggestion . . . that the State 
may have adopted a different system in practice from that 
specified by statute." 488 U. S., at 345. "Indeed, [the 
assessor's] practice seems contrary to that of the guide 
published by the West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid 
to local assessors in the assessment of real property." Ibid.; 
see also ibid. ("We are not advised of any West Virginia 
statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of 
the State to fashion their own substantive assessment 
policies independently of state statute"). The Court refused 
to decide "whether the Webster County assessment method 
would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a 
State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational 
enforcement policy it appears to be." Id., at 344, n. 4. 
Finally, the Court declared, "*[IIntentional systematic 
undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property 
in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one 
taxed upon the full value of his property.'" Id., at 345 
(quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 
352-353 (1918), and citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota 
County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923), and Cumberland Coal Co. v. 
Board of Revision of Tax Assessments in Green County, Pa., 
284 U. S. 23 (1931)). The Court concluded that the assess-
ments for the coal companies' Dronprtip* haH failpH tHpc* 
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II 
As the Court accurately states today, "this Court's cases" 
Allegheny Pittsburgh aside—"are clear that, unless a 
classification warrants some form of heightened review 
because it jeopardizes [the] exercise of a fundamental right 
or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect charac-
teristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the 
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest." 
Ante, at 7; see also Burlington N. R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U. S. 
t (1992); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 
410 U, S. 356, 359 (1973). The California tax system, like 
most, does not involve either suspect classes or fundamental 
rights, and the Court properly reviews California's classifi-
cation for a rational basis. Today's review, however, differs 
from the review in Allegheny Pittsburgh. 
The Court's analysis in Allegheny Pittsburgh is suscepti-
ble, I think, to at least three interpretations. The first is 
the one offered by petitioner. Under her reading of the 
case, properties are "similarly situated" or within the same 
"class" for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause 
when they are located in roughly the same types of neigh-
borhoods, for example, are roughly the same size, and are 
roughly the same in other, unspecified ways. According to 
petitioner, the Webster County assessor's plan violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because she had failed to achieve 
a "seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treat-
ment" of all the objectively comparable properties in 
Webster County, presumably those with about the same 
acreage and about the same amount of coal. Petitioner 
contends that Proposition 13 suffers from similar flaws. In 
1989, she points out, "the long-time owner of a stately 
7,800-square-foot, seven-bedroom mansion on a huge lot in 
Beverly Hills (among the most luxurious homes in one of 
the most expensive neighborhoods in Los Angeles County) 
. . . paid less property tax annually than the new homeown-
er of a tiny 980-square-foot home on a small lot in an 
extremely modest Venice neighborhood." Brief for Peti-
tioner 5; see also id., at 7 (Petitioner s "1988 property tax 
assessment on her unpretentious Baldwin Hills tract home 
is almost identical to that of a pre-1976 owner of a fabulous 
beach-front Malibu residential property worth $2.1 million, 
even though her property is worth only l/12th as much as 
his"). Because California not only has not tried to repair 
this systematic, intentional, and gross disparity in taxation, 
but has enacted it into positive law, petitioner argues, 
Proposition 13 violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
This argument rests, in my view, on a basic misunder-
standing of Allegheny Pittsburgh. The Court there proceed-
ed on the assumption of law (assumed because the parties 
did not contest it) that the initial classification, by the 
State, was constitutional, and the assumption of fact 
(assumed because the parties had so stipulated) that the 
properties were comparable under the State's classification. 
But cf. Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 271-272 (noting 
that some of the properties contained coal and others did 
not). In referring to the tax treatment of a "class of 
property holders," or "similarly situated property owners," 
488 U. S., at 343, the Court did not purport to review the 
constitutionality of the initial classification, by market 
value, drawn by the State, as opposed to the further 
subclassification within the initial class, by acquisition 
value, drawn by the assessor. Instead, Allegheny Pitts-
burgh assumed that whether properties or persons are 
similarly situated depended on state law, and not, as 
petitioner argues, on some neutral criteria such as size or 
location that serve as proxies for market value. Under that 
classifying property. But the Equal Protection Clause does 
not prescribe a single method of taxation. We have consis-
tently rejected petitioner's theory, see, e. g., Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Conway, 281 U. S. 146 (1930); Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890), and the Court properly rejects 
it today. 
Allegheny Pittsburgh, then, does not prevent the State of 
California from classifying properties on the basis of their 
value at acquisition, so long as the classification is support-
ed by a rational basis. I agree with the Court that it is, 
both for the reasons given by this Court, see ante, at 9-12, 
and for the reasons given by the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. 
State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P. 2d 1281 
(1978). But the classification employed by the Webster 
County assessor, indistinguishable from California's, was 
rational for all those reasons as well. In answering 
petitioner's argument that Allegheny Pittsburgh controls 
here, respondents offer a second explanation for that case. 
JUSTICE STEVENS gives much the same explanation, see 
post, at 4-5, though he concludes in the end that Proposi-
tion 13, after Allegheny Pittsburgh, is unconstitutional. 
According to respondents, the Equal Protection Clause 
permits a State itself to determine which properties are 
similarly situated, as the State of California did here 
(classifying properties by acquisition value) and as the State 
of West Virginia did in Allegheny Pittsburgh (classifying 
properties by market value). But once a state does so, 
respondents suggest, the Equal Protection Clause requires 
after Allegheny Pittsburgh that properties in the same class 
be accorded seasonably equal treatment and not be inten-
tionally and systematically undervalued. Proposition 13 
provides for the assessment of properties in the same state-
determined class regularly and at roughly full value; this 
contrasts with the tax scheme in Webster County, where by 
dividing property in the same class (by market value) into 
a subclass (by acquisition value), the assessor regularly 
undervalued the property similarly situated. This, accord-
in? to respondents, made the Webster County scheme 
unconstitutional, and distinguishes Proposition 13. 
Respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh is, in my 
view, as misplaced as petitioner's; their test, for starters, 
comes with a dubious pedigree. In one of the cases cited in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh, Allied Stores, we upheld against 
an equal protection challenge a statute that exempted some 
corporations from ad valorem taxes imposed on others. Not 
only does Allied Stores not even hint that the Constitution 
"require[s] . . . the seasonable attainment of a rough 
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property 
owners," 488 U. S., at 343, we took pains there to stress a 
very different proposition: 
"The States have very wide discretion in the laying of 
their taxes. . . . Of course, the States, in the exercise of 
their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, 
prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropri-
ate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State 
. . . is not required to resort to close distinctions or to 
maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference 
to composition, use or value." Allied Stores, 358 U. S., 
at 526-527. 
Two of the other cases cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh, 
Sunday Lake Iron and Sioux City Bridge, also rejected 
equal protection challenges, see also Charleston Fed. 
o~...-™
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and the case in which the words intentional, systematic, 
and undervaluation first appeared, Coulter v. Louisville & 
Nashville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599, 609 (1905), did not explain 
where the test came from or why. 
It is true that we applied the rule of Coulter to strike 
down a tax system in Cumberland Coal, also cited in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh. Cumberland Coal, however, reflects 
the most serious of the problems with respondents' reading 
of Allegheny Pittsburgh. As respondents understand these 
two cases, their rule is categorical: A tax scheme violates 
the Equal Protection Clause unless it provides for "the 
seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment" 
or if it results in "intentional systematic undervaluation'" 
of properties similarly situated by state law, 488 U. S., at 
343, 345. This would be so regardless of whether the 
inequality or the undervaluation, which may result (as in 
Webster County) from further classifications of properties 
within a class, is supported by a rational basis. But not 
since the coming of modern equal protection jurisprudence 
lias this Court supplanted the rational judgments of state 
representatives with its own notions of "rough equality," 
'undervaluation," or "fairness." Cumberland Coal, which 
ails even to mention rational-basis review, conflicts with 
>ur current caselaw. Allegheny Pittsburgh did not, in my 
riew, mean to return us to the era when this Court some-
imes second-guessed state tax officials. In rejecting today 
espondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court, as 
understand it, agrees. 
This brings me to the third explanation for Allegheny 
Pittsburgh, the one offered today by the Court. The Court 
iroceeds in what purports to be our standard equal protec-
ion framework, though it reapplies an old, and to my mind 
iiscredited, gloss to rational-basis review. The Court 
oncedes that the "Equal Protection Clause does not 
emand for purposes of rational-basis review that a 
»gislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate 
t any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classifi-
ation." Ante, at 13 (citing United States Railroad Retire-
tent Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,179 (1980)). This principle 
pplies, the Court acknowledges, not only to an initial 
lassi6cation but to all further classifications within a class. 
Nevertheless, this Court's review does require that a 
urpose may conceivably or 'may reasonably have been the 
urpose and policy' of the relevant governmental decision-
laker," the Court says, ante, at 13 (quoting A Hied Stores, 
ipra, at 528-529), and uAllegheny Pittsburgh was the rare 
isc where the facts precluded any plausible inference that 
ic reason for the unequal assessment practice was to 
:hieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme," 
itc, at 13. Rather than obeying the "law of a State, 
>nerally applied," the county assessor had administered an 
iberrational enforcement policy," 488 U. S., at 344, n. 4. 
?e ante, at 13. According to the Court, therefore, the 
•oblem in Allegheny Pittsburgh was that the Webster 
3unty scheme, though otherwise rational, was irrational 
jcause it was contrary to state law. Any rational bases 
iderlying the acquisition-value scheme were "implausible" 
r "unreasonable") because they were made so by the Con-
itution and laws of the State of West Virginia. 
That explanation, like petitioner's and respondents', is in 
nsion with settled case law. Even if the assessor did 
olate West Virginia law (and that she did is open to 
testion, see In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida 
)al Co., W. Va. , , 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564 
987)), she would not have violated the Equal Protection 
ause. A violation of state law does not by itself constitute 
Eola t ion of t h e F p f W f l l P.nnRtit.iitinn W P maHe tViat r loar 
in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1944), for instance, 
where a candidate for state office complained that members 
of the local canvassing board had refused to certify his 
name as a nominee to the Secretary of State, thus violating 
an Illinois statute. Because the plaintiff had not alleged, 
say, that the defendants had meant to discriminate against 
him on racial grounds, but merely that they had failed to 
comply with a statute, we rejected the argument that the 
defendants had thereby violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
"[N]ot every denial of a right conferred by state law 
involves a denial of the equal protection of the laws, 
even though the denial of the right to one person may 
operate to confer it on another.. . . [Wlhere the official 
action purports to be in conformity to the statutory 
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of 
the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, 
is not without more a denial of the equal protection of 
the laws." Id., at 8. 
See also Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 
U.S. 362(1940). 
The Court today promises not to have overruled Snowden, 
see ante, at 14, n. 8, but its disclaimer, I think, is in vain. 
For if, as the Court suggests, what made the assessor's 
method unreasonable was her supposed violation of state 
law, the Court's interpretation of Allegheny Pittsburgh 
recasts in this case the proposition that we had earlier 
rejected. See Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 268-269; 
Cohen, 38 UCLA L. Rev, at 93-94; Ely, Another Spin on 
Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 107, 108-109 
(1990). In repudiating Snowden, moreover, the Court 
threatens settled principles not only of the Fourteenth 
Amendment but of the Eleventh. We have held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering 
state actors to conform to the dictates of state law. 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 
U. S. 89 (1984). After today, however, a plaintiff might be 
able invoke federal jurisdiction to have state actors obey 
state law, for a claim that the state actor has violated state 
law appears to have become a claim that he has violated 
the Constitution. See Cohen, supra, at 103; Ely, supra, at 
109-110 ("[B]y the Court's logic, all violations of state 
law—at least those violations that end (as most do) in the 
treatment of some people better than others—are theoreti-
cally convertible into violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause"). 
I understand that the Court prefers to distinguish 
Allegheny Pittsburgh, but in doing so, I think, the Court has 
left our equal protection jurisprudence in disarray. The 
analysis appropriate to this case is straightforward. Unless 
a classification involves suspect classes or fundamental 
rights, judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
demands only a conceivable rational basis for the chal-
lenged state distinction. See Fritz, supra; Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U. S. 662, 
702-706, and n. 13 (1981 )(REHNQU1ST, J., dissenting). This 
basis need not be one identified by the State itself; in fact, 
States need not articulate any reasons at all for their 
actions. See ibid. Proposition 13, 1 believe, satisfies this 
standard—but so, for the same reasons, did the scheme 
employed in Webster County. See Brief for Pacific Legal 
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 7, 9-10, Brief for Na-
tional Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae 9-13, 
Brief for Respondent 31-32, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal 
Co. v. County Commfn of Webster County, O. T. 1988, Nos. 
fi7_1QHQ G*7_191/V ~»w« «* o m All—L m.'^-t 1. 
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appears to have survived today's decision. I wonder, 
though, about its legacy. 
* * * 
I concur in the judgment of the Court and join Part II-A 
of its opinion. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
During the two past decades, California property owners 
have enjoyed extraordinary prosperity. As the State's 
population has mushroomed, so has the value of its real 
estate. Between 1976 and 1986 alone, the total assessed 
value of California property subject to property taxation 
increased tenfold.1 Simply put, those who invested in 
California real estate in the 1970s are among the most 
fortunate capitalists in the world. 
Proposition 13 has provided these successful investors 
with a tremendous windfall and, in doing so, has created 
severe inequities in California's property tax scheme. 
These property owners (hereinafter "the Squires") are 
guaranteed that, so long as they retain their property and 
do not improve it, their taxes will not increase more than 
2% in any given year. As a direct result of this windfall for 
the Squires, later purchasers must pay far more than then-
fair share of property taxes. 
The specific disparity that prompted petitioner to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of Proposition 13 is the fact that 
her annual property tax bill is almost 5 times as large as 
that of her neighbors who own comparable homes: While 
her neighbors' 1989 taxes averaged less than $400, petition-
er was taxed $1,700. App. 18-20. This disparity is not 
unusual under Proposition 13. Indeed, some homeowners 
pay 17 times as much in taxes as their neighbors with 
comparable property. See id., at 76-77. For vacant land, 
the disparities may be as great as 500 to 1. App. to Pet. for 
Cert. A7. Moreover, as Proposition 13 controls the taxation 
of commercial property as well as residential property, the 
regime greatly favors the commercial enterprises of the 
Squires, placing new businesses at a substantial disadvan-
tage. 
As a result of Proposition 13, the Squires, who own 44% 
of the owner-occupied residences, paid only 25% of the total 
taxes collected from homeowners in 1989. Report of Senate 
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the 
California State Senate 33 (1991) (Commission Report). 
These disparities are aggravated by § 2 of Proposition 13, 
which exempts from reappraisal a property owner's home 
and up to $1 million of other real property when that 
property is transferred to a child of the owner. This 
exemption can be invoked repeatedly and indefinitely, 
allowing the Proposition 13 windfall to be passed from 
generation to generation. As the California Senate Com-
mission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue observed: 
The inequity is clear. One young family buys a new 
home and is assessed at full market value. Another 
'Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 261, 
270, n. 49 (1990). Tor the same period, {property values ml Hawaii rose 
approximately 450%; Washington, D.C. approximately 350%; and New 
York approximately 125%." Ibid, (citing 2 U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values 86-111, Table 12 (1987); 2 
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values 
and AssessmentfSales Price Ratios 42, Table 2 (1977)). 
2Proposition 13 was codified as Article XIIIA of the California 
Constitution; for convenience sake, however, I refer to it by its colloquial 
young family inherits its home, but pays taxes based on 
their parents' date of acquisition even though both 
homes are of identical value. Not only does this 
constitutional provision offend a policy of equal tax 
treatment for taxpayers in similar situations, it ap-
pears to favor the housing needs of children with home-
owner-parents over children with non-homeowner-
parents. With the repeal of the state's gift and inheri-
tance tax in 1982, the rationale for this exemption is 
negligible." Commission Report, at 9-10. 
The Commission was too generous. To my mind, the 
rationale for such disparity is not merely "negligible," it is 
nonexistent. Such a law establishes a privilege of a 
medieval character: Two families with equal needs and 
equal resources are treated differently solely because of 
their different heritage. 
In my opinion, such disparate treatment of similarly 
situated taxpayers is arbitrary and unreasonable. Although 
the Court today recognizes these gross inequities, see ante, 
at 4, n. 2, its analysis of the justification for those inequities 
consists largely of a restatement of the benefits that accrue 
to long-time property owners. That a law benefits those it 
benefits cannot be an adequate justification for severe 
inequalities such as those created by Proposition 13. 
I 
The standard by which we review equal protection 
challenges to state tax regimes is well-established and 
properly deferential. "Where taxation is concerned and no 
specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is 
imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifi-
cations and drawing lines which in their judgment produce 
reasonable systems of taxation." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore 
Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973). Thus, as the 
Court today notes, the issue in this case is "whether the 
difference in treatment between newer and older owners 
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Ante, at 8.3 
But deference is not abdication and "rational basis 
scrutiny" is still scrutiny. Thus we have, on several recent 
occasions, invalidated tax schemes under such a standard 
of review. See e. g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County 
ComvrCn of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989); Hooper v. 
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612, 618 (1985); 
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869 (1985); cf. Zobel v. Williams, 
457 U.S. 55,60-61(1982). 
Just three Terms ago, this Court unanimously invalidated 
Webster County, West Virginia's assessment scheme under 
rational-basis scrutiny. Webster County employed a de 
facto Proposition 13 assessment system: The County 
assessed recently purchased property on the basis of its 
purchase price but made only occasional adjustments 
(averaging 3-4% per year) to the assessments of other 
properties. Just as in this case, "[t]his approach systemati-
cally produced dramatic differences in valuation between 
. . . recently transferred property and otherwise comparable 
surrounding land." Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at 341. 
The "*[i]ntentional systematic undervaluation/" id,, at 
345, found constitutionally infirm in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
3As the Court notes, ante, at 8, petitioner contends that Proposition 13 
infringes on the constitutional right to travel and that, accordingly, a 
more searching standard of review is appropriate. There is no need U 
address that issue because the gross disparities created by Pro posit) or 
13 do not pass even the most deferential standard of review. Cf. Hoopei 
v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985); Zobel v 
Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1982). 
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has been codified in California by Proposition 13. That the 
discrimination in Allegheny Pittsburgh was de facto and the 
discrimination in this case de jure makes little difference. 
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to secure every person within the 
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a 
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted 
agents" Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 
352-353 (1918) (emphasis added). If anything, the inequal-
ity created by Proposition 13 is constitutionally more 
problematic because it is the product of a state-wide policy 
rather than the result of an individual assessor's mal-
administration. 
Nor can Allegheny Pittsburgh be distinguished because 
West Virginia law established a market-value assessment 
regime. Webster County's scheme was constitutionally 
invalid not because it was a departure from state law, but 
because it involved the relative "'systematic undervaluation 
. . . [of] property in the same class'" (as that class was 
defined by state law). Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at 
345 (emphasis added). Our decisions have established that 
the Equal Protection Clause is offended as much by the 
arbitrary delineation of classes of property (as in this case) 
as by the arbitrary treatment of properties within the same 
class (as in Allegheny Pittsburgh). See Brown Forman Co. 
v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910); Cumberland Coal 
Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23, 28-30 (1931). Thus, 
if our unanimous holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh was 
sound—and I remain convinced that it was—it follows 
inexorably that Proposition 13, like Webster County's 
?issessment scheme, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Indeed, in my opinion, state-wide discrimination is far more 
invidious than a local aberration that creates a tax dis-
parity. 
The States, of course, have broad power to classify 
property in their taxing schemes and if the "classification is 
neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some 
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no 
lenial of the equal protection of the law." Brown-Forman 
Zo. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S., at 573. As we stated in Alleghe-
ny Pittsburgh, a "State may divide different kinds of 
>roperty into classes and assign to each class a different tax 
furden so long as those divisions and burdens are reason-
ible." 488 U. S., at 344. 
Consistent with this standard, the Court has long upheld 
ax classes based on the taxpayer's ability to pay, see, e.g., 
'ox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 101 
1935); the nature (tangible or intangible) of the property, 
ee, e.g., Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax Supervi-
irs, 282 U. S. 19, 23-24 (1930); the use of the property, 
3e, e.g., Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114 (1900); and 
le status (corporate or individual) of the property owner, 
se, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 
. S. 356 (1973). Proposition 13 employs none of these 
imiliar classifications. Instead it classifies property based 
I its nominal purchase price: All property purchased for 
le same price is taxed the same amount (leaving aside the 
7c annual adjustment). That this scheme can be named 
n "acquisition value" system) does not render it any less 
•bitrary or unreasonable. Under Proposition 13, a 
ajestic estate purchased for $150,000 in 1975 (and now 
orth more than $2 million) is placed in the same tax class 
; a humble cottage purchased today for $150,000. The 
dy feature those two properties have in common is that 
me where, sometime a sale contract for each was executed 
at contained the nrirp "fcisnnnn" Po^i«»i—1» : - — 
environment of phenomenal real property appreciation, to 
classify property based on its purchase price is "palpably 
arbitrary." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S 
522,530(1959). 
II 
Under contemporary equal protection doctrine, the test of 
whether a classification is arbitrary is "whether the 
difference in treatment between [earlier and later purchas-
ers] rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Ante, 
at 8. The adjectives and adverbs in this standard are more 
important than the nouns and verbs. 
A legitimate state interest must encompass the interests 
of members of the disadvantaged class and the community 
at large as well as the direct interests of the members of 
the favored class. It must have a purpose or goal indepen-
dent of the direct effect of the legislation and one "'that we 
may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial 
legislature.'" Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 
U. S. 432,452, n. 4 (1985) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 
166,180-181 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment)). 
That a classification must find justification outside itself 
saves judicial review of such classifications from becoming 
an exercise in tautological reasoning. 
"A State cannot deflect an equal protection challenge by 
observing that in light of the statutory classification all 
those within the burdened class are similarly situated. 
The classification must reflect pre-existing differences; 
it cannot create new ones that are supported by only 
their own bootstraps. 'The Equal Protection Clause 
requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory 
application within the class it establishes.' Rinaldi v. 
Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 308 (1966)." Williams v. Ver-
mont, 472 U. S. 14, 27 (1985). 
If the goal of the discriminatory classification is not 
independent from the policy itself, "each choice [of classifi-
cation] will import its own goal, each goal will count as 
acceptable, and the requirement of a rational' choice-goal 
relation will be satisfied by the very making of the choice." 
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205, 1247 (1970). 
A classification rationally furthers a state interest when 
there is some fit between the disparate treatment and the 
legislative purpose. As noted above, in the review of tax 
statutes we have allowed such fit to be generous and 
approximate, recognizing that "rational distinctions may be 
made with substantially less than mathematical exacti-
tude." New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). 
Nonetheless, in some cases the underinclusiveness or the 
overinclusiveness of a classification will be so severe that it 
cannot be said that the legislative distinction "rationally 
furthers" the posited state interest.4 See, e.g., Jimenez v. 
Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 636-638 (1974). 
The Court's cursory analysis of Proposition 13 pays little 
attention to either of these aspects of the controlling 
standard of review. The first state interest identified by the 
Court is California's "interest in local neighborhood preser-
vation, continuity, and stability." Ante, at 9 (citing Euclid 
4
 "Herod, ordering the death of all male children born on a particular 
day because one of them would some day bring about his downfall, 
employed such a[n ovennclusive] classification!, as did tjhe wartime 
treatment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry (which imposed! 
burdens upon a large class of individuals because some of them were 
believed to be disloyal." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of 
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v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926)). It is beyond 
question that "inhibiting the] displacement of lower income 
families by the forces of gentnfication," ante, at 9-10, is a 
legitimate state interest; the central issue is whether the 
disparate treatment of earlier and later purchasers ratio-
nally furthers this goal. Here the Court offers not an 
analysis, but only a conclusion: "By permitting older owners 
to pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of 
comparable property, [Proposition 13] rationally furthers 
this interest." Ante, at 10. 
I disagree. In my opinion, Proposition 13 sweeps too 
broadly and operates too indiscriminately to "rationally 
further" the State's interest in neighborhood preservation. 
No doubt there are some early purchasers living on fixed or 
limited incomes who could not afford to pay higher taxes 
and still maintain their homes. California has enacted 
special legislation to respond to their plight.5 Those 
concerns cannot provide an adequate justification for 
Proposition 13. A state-wide, across-the-board tax windfall 
for all property owners and their descendants is no more a 
"rational" means for protecting this small subgroup than a 
blanket tax exemption for all taxpayers named Smith would 
be a rational means to protect a particular taxpayer named 
Smith who demonstrated difficulty paying her tax bill. 
Even within densely populated Los Angeles County, 
residential property comprises less than half of the market 
value of the property tax roll. App. 45. It cannot be said 
that the legitimate state interest in preserving neighbor-
hood character is "rationally furthered" by tax benefits for 
owners of commercial, industrial, vacant, and other nonresi-
dential properties.6 It is just short of absurd to conclude 
that the legitimate state interest in protecting a relatively 
small number of economically vulnerable families is 
"rationally furthered" by a tax windfall for all 9,787,887 
property owners7 in California. 
The Court's conclusion is unsound not only because of the 
lack of numerical fit between the posited state interest and 
Proposition 13's inequities but also because of the lack of 
logical fit between ends and means. Although the State 
may have a valid interest in preserving some neighbor-
hoods,8 Proposition 13 not only "inhibitfs the] displace-
5
 As pointed out in the Commission Report, California has addressed 
this specific problem with specific legislation. The State has established 
two programs: 
"Senior Citizens Property Tax Assistance. Provides refunds of up to 
ninety-six percent of property taxes to low income homeowners over age 
62. 
"Senior Citizens Property Tax Postponement. Allows senior citizens with 
incomes under $20,000 to postpone all or part of the taxes on their homes 
until an ownership change occurs." Commission Report 23. 
6The Court's rationale for upholding Proposition 13 does not even 
arguably apply to vacant property. That, as the Court recognizes, 
Proposition 13 discourages changes of ownership means that the law 
creates an impediment to the transfer and development of such property 
no matter now socially desirable its improvement might be. It is equally 
plain that the competitive advantage enjoyed by the Squires who own 
commercial property is wholly unjustified. There is no rational state 
interest in providing those entrepreneurs with a special privilege that 
tends to discourage otherwise desirable transfers of income-producing 
property. In a free economy, the entry of new competitors should be 
encouraged, not arbitrarily hampered by unfavorable tax treatment. 
Brief for California Assessors' Association as Amicus Curiae 2. 
•The ambiguous character of this interest is illustrated by the options 
faced by a married couple that owns a three- or four-bedroom home that 
suited their family needs while their children lived at home. After the 
children have moved out, increased taxes and maintenance expenses 
would—absent Proposition 13—tend to motivate the sale of the home to 
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ment" of settled families, it also inhibits the transfer of 
unimproved land, abandoned buildings, and substandard 
uses. Thus, contrary to the Court's suggestion, Proposition 
13 is not like a zoning system. A zoning system functions 
by recognizing different uses of property and treating those 
different uses differently. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U. S., at 388-390. Proposition 13 treats all property 
alike, giving all owners tax breaks, and discouraging the 
transfer or improvement of all property—the developed and 
the dilapidated, the neighborly and the nuisance. 
In short, although I agree with the Court that "neighbor-
hood preservation" is a legitimate state interest, I cannot 
agree that a tax windfall for all persons who purchased 
property before 1978 rationally furthers that interest. To 
my mind, Proposition 13 is too blunt a tool to accomplish 
such a specialized goal. The severe inequalities created by 
Proposition 13 cannot be justified by such an interest.9 
The second state interest identified by the Court is the 
"reliance interests" of the earlier purchasers. Here I find 
the Court's reasoning difficult to follow. Although the 
protection of reasonable reliance interests is a legitimate 
governmental purpose, see Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 
728, 746 (1984), this case does not implicate such interests. 
A reliance interest is created when an individual justifiably 
acts under the assumption that an existing legal condition 
will persist; thus reliance interests are most often implicat-
ed when the government provides some benefit and then 
acts to eliminate the benefit. See, e.g., New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976). In this case, those who 
purchased property before Proposition 13 was enacted 
received no assurances that assessments would only 
increase at a limited rate; indeed, to the contrary, many 
purchased property in the hope that property values (and 
assessments) would appreciate substantially and quickly. 
It cannot be said, therefore, that the earlier purchasers of 
property somehow have a reliance interest in limited tax 
increases. 
Perhaps what the Court means is that post-Proposition 
13 purchasers have less reliance interests than pre-Proposi-
tion 13 purchasers. The Court reasons that the State may 
tax earlier and later purchasers differently because 
"an existing owner rationally may be thought to have 
vested expectations in his property or home that are 
more deserving of protection than the anticipatory 
expectations of a new owner at the point of purchase. 
A new owner has full information about the scope of 
future tax liability before acquiring the property, and 
if he thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he 
can decide not to complete the purchase at all. By 
contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with his 
purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to 
13, however, subsidizes the wasteful retention of unused housing 
capacity, making the sale of the home unwise and the rental of the extra 
space unnecessary. 
•Respondent contends that the inequities created by Proposition 13 are 
justified by the State's interest in protecting property owners from 
taxation on unrealized appreciation. The California Supreme Court 
relied on a similar state interest. See Amador Valley Joint Union High 
School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 236-238, 583 
P. 2d 1281, 1309-1311 (1978). This argument is closely related to the 
Court's-reasoning concerning "neighborhood preservation"; respondent 
claims the State has an interest in preventing the situation in which 
"skyrocketing real estate prices . . . dnvfe} property taxes beyond some 
taxpayers' ability to pay." Bnef for Respondent 19. As demonstrated 
above, whatever the connection between acquisition price and "ability to 
pay," a blanket tax windfall for all early purchasers of property (and 
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buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high." Ante, 
at 10.,0 
This simply restates the effects of Proposition 13. A pre-
Proposition 13 owner has "vested expectations" in reduced 
taxes only because Proposition 13 gave her such expecta-
tions; a later purchaser has no such expectations because 
Proposition 13 does not provide her such expectations. But 
the same can be said of any arbitrary protection for an 
existing class of taxpayers. Consider a law that establishes 
that homes with even street numbers would be taxed at 
twice the rate of homes with odd street numbers. It is 
certainly true that the even-numbered homeowners could 
not decide to "unpurchase" their homes and that those 
considering buying an even-numbered home would know 
that it came with an extra tax burden, but certainly that 
would not justify the arbitrary imposition of disparate tax 
burdens based on house numbers. So it is in this case. 
Proposition 13 provides a benefit for earlier purchasers and 
imposes a burden on later purchasers. To say that the later 
purchasers know what they are getting into does not 
answer the critical question: Is it reasonable and constitu-
tional to tax early purchasers less than late purchasers 
when at the time of taxation their properties are compara-
ble? This question the Court does not answer. 
Distilled to its essence, the Court seems to be saying that 
earlier purchasers can benefit under Proposition 13 because 
earlier purchasers benefit under Proposition 13. If, howev-
er, a law creates a disparity, the State's interest preserving 
that disparity cannot be a "legitimate state interest" 
justifying that inequity. As noted above, a statute's 
disparate treatment must be justified by a purpose distinct 
from the very effects created by that statute. Thus, I 
disagree with the Court that the severe inequities wrought 
by Proposition 13 can be justified by what the Court calls 
the "reliance interests" of those who benefit from that 
scheme.11 
In my opinion, it is irrational to treat similarly situated 
persons differently on the basis of the date they joined the 
class of property owners. Until today, I would have thought 
this proposition far from controversial. In Zobel v. Wil-
liams, 457 U. S. 55 (1982), we ruled that Alaska's program 
of distributing cash dividends on the basis of the recipient's 
years of residency in the State violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Court wrote: 
"If the states can make the amount of a cash divi-
dend depend on length of residence, what would 
preclude varying university tuition on a sliding scale 
based on years of residence—or even limiting access of 
finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for 
civil service jobs, or for government contracts by length 
of domicile? Could states impose different taxes based 
on length of residence! Alaska's reasoning could open 
the door to state apportionment of other rights, bene-
'"The Court's sympathetic reference to "existing ownerfs] already 
saddled" with their property should not obscure the fact that these early 
purchasers have already seen their property increase in value more than 
tenfold. 
"Respondent, drawing on the analysis of the California Supreme 
Court, contends that the inequities created by Proposition 13 are also 
justified by the State's interest in "permitting the taxpayer to make more 
careful and accurate predictions of future tax liability." Amador Valley, 
22 Cal.3d, at 239, 583 P. 2d, at 1312. This analysis suffers from the 
same infirmity as the Court's "reliance" analysis. I agree that Proposi-
tion 13 permits greater predictability of tax liability; the relevant 
question, however, is whether the inequities between earlier and later 
rmrrVift«pr« rrpnt«»d hv Prnnn^itinn 13 ran HP iu«±ifipd hv Rnmpthincr other 
fits, and services according to length of residency. It 
would permit the states to divide citizens into expand-
ing numbers of permanent classes. Such a result 
would be clearly impermissible." Id., at 64 (emphasis 
added) (footnotes omitted). 
Similarly, the Court invalidated on equal protection 
grounds New Mexico's policy of providing a permanent tax 
exemption for Vietnam veterans who had been state 
residents before May 8, 1976, but not to more recent 
arrivals. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 
612 (1985). The Court expressly rejected the State's claim 
that it had a legitimate interest in providing special 
rewards to veterans who lived in the State before 1976 and 
concluded that a[n]either the Equal Protection Clause, nor 
this Court's precedents, permit the State to prefer estab-
lished resident veterans over newcomers in the retroactive 
apportionment of an economic benefit.* Id., at 623. 
As these decisions demonstrate, the selective provision of 
benefits based on the timing of one's membership in a class 
(whether that class be the class of residents or the class of 
property owners) is rarely a legitimate state interest." 
Similarly situated neighbors have an equal right to share 
in the benefits of local government. It would obviously be 
unconstitutional to provide one with more or better fire or 
police protection than the other; it is just as plainly 
unconstitutional to require one to pay five times as much in 
property taxes as the other for the same government 
services. In my opinion, the severe inequahties created by 
Proposition 13 are arbitrary and unreasonable and do not 
rationally further a legitimate state interest. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
CARLYLE W. HALL JR., Los Angeles, Calif. (MARY LOUISE 
COHEN, ANN E. CARLSON, ELIZA VORENBERG, and HALL 
& PHILLIPS, on the briefs) for petitioner; REX E. LEE, Provo, Utah 
(CARTER G. PHILLIPS, MARK D. HOPSON, CHRISTOPHER 
R. DRAHOZAL, SIDLEY & AUSTIN, DEWITT W. CLINTON, 
RAYMOND G. FORTNER JR., LAWRENCE B. LAUNER, DA-
VID L. MU1R, and ALBERT RAMSEYER, on the briefs) for 
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Respondents, who are white, were charged with assaulting two African-
Americans. Before jury selection began, the trial judge denied the 
prosecution's motion to prohibit respondents from exercising peremp-
tory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The Georgia 
Supreme Court affirmed, distinguishing Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U. S. —in which this Court held that private 
litigants cannot exercise peremptory strikes in a racially discrimina-
tory manner—on the ground that it involved civil litigants rather 
than criminal defendants. 
Held: The Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging 
in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges, 
(a) The exercise of raciallv discriminatory peremptory challenges 
